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Abstract
Across two experiments, Newell, Rakow, Yechiam, and Sambur (2016) demonstrated that
providing rare disaster information increased people’s tolerance for risk-taking. These
results motivated a series of as yet-unpublished follow-up experiments involving new
manipulations. However, the failure to replicate the original finding in these follow-ups has
led our confidence in the original effect to wane. The aim of this registered report was to
reconsider the evidence, published and unpublished, for the rare disaster information effect
in light of new data. We conducted a large scale replication (N = 242) in which we failed
to find evidence for the effect reported in Newell et al. thus further reducing our
confidence. This registered report format provides a transparent framework by which to
address the discrepancy between the published and previously-unpublished findings.
Keywords: replication, disaster information effect, risky choice
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Introduction
At the close of 2017, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP23) gathered against
the backdrop of the most active Atlantic hurricane season in North America. The
unprecedented frequency and intensity of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria warned
nations of the risks posed by climate-exaggerated natural disasters. These recent events
highlight the importance of understanding how individuals interpret and respond to
information about the changing environmental risks in the world. The aim of this paper is
to evaluate a line of published and unpublished experiments that examined people’s
reaction to disaster information. Two experiments in Newell, Rakow, Yechiam, and Sambur
(2016) demonstrated that providing rare disaster information could counter-intuitively
increase risk-taking in a computer-controlled micro-world (see Figure 1).
The micro-world was divided into three villages differentially exposed to natural
disasters (see Figure 1). On each trial, participants chose a house in which to ‘live’ and
received feedback in the form of disaster reports (explained further in Methods).
Participants who received the most comprehensive disaster reports that covered the entire
micro-world (i.e. forgone feedback for all 3 villages) made riskier choices compared to their
less informed counterparts (i.e. forgone feedback for only the selected village, or feedback
for only their selected house). By way of the hurricane analogy, informing people about the
occurrence of hurricanes in a region resulted in an increase, not decrease, in the likelihood
to visit, do business etc. in that disaster-prone region. Despite the paradoxical impact of
disaster information on risk taking, confidence in the effect (illustrated in Figure 2, Panel
A) was founded upon several factors; that it replicated across two experimental
populations in different countries (total N = 180), persisted over hundreds of rounds of
choices, and persisted even when the expected value of the risky choice was worse than
that of the safe choice. Moreover, a similar effect of feedback upon risk preference had been
found in a simpler risk-taking task involving only monetary gambles (Yechiam, Rakow, &
Newell, 2015).
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Figure 1 . The micro-world separated into three villages (represented by the three clusters
of coloured squares). The top right table displays the payoff distributions for each village
and was visible to all participants throughout the experiment (see Table 1 for additional
information).
The results of Newell et al. (2016) motivated a series of follow-up experiments to
explore why disaster reports covering all the villages produced riskier choices. One
explanation was that round-by-round disaster reports with full feedback taught people that
‘usually nothing goes wrong’, thereby encouraging participants to continually take the risk.
To address this explanation, one series of follow-up experiments introduced a historical
component to the disaster reports aimed to encourage a long-term view of the risks. By
visually depicting the village’s disaster history, this manipulation was predicted to reduce
the risk-tolerance for participants receiving all-villages disaster reports. A second line of
experiments spawned from framing effects in the decisions from experience literature
(Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In decisions from
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experience tasks, a loss framing produces choice patterns consistent with risk seeking
(Rakow & Newell, 2010). Newell et al. (2016) used a mixed framing whereby points were
accrued on rounds in which no disaster occurred (analogous to reaping the benefits of a
crop harvest in a non-disaster year) and lost due to natural disasters. In this new line of
experiments, loss framing was instantiated as round-by-round rental payments. It was
predicted that the loss framing would increase the proportion of risky choices.
Ultimately, the original disaster information effect failed to replicate in both lines of
experiments (see Figure 2, Panel B, C and D). Historical elements of the disaster reports
did not produce discernible differences in risk taking though the loss framing did increase
the overall risky choice proportions. More concerningly however, we failed to replicate the
feedback effect in each of the four experiments (replication conditions aggregated in Panel
B of Figure 2; see Supplementary materials for more details). Taken together, after
examining the overall risky choice proportions in each of the four follow-up experiments,
our confidence in the original feedback effect has waned.
Although it is possible that introducing new manipulations may have influenced the
results in unexpected ways, the robustness of the feedback effect is undoubtedly in
question. The point of this paper is to not only be candid about our uncertainty, but also
to reduce this uncertainty (in one direction or the other). A pre-registered replication offers
a transparent framework to examine the stability of the effect, if it exists, while
simultaneously avoiding the incentives driving publication bias and file drawers.
Psychology’s recent focus on reproducibility has spawned numerous publications on the
value of replication and we have adopted some of their recommendations here (Kruschke,
2013; Nosek et al., 2015; Simons, 2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2017). Principally, we adopt
the use of Bayesian statistical tests in this registered replication. Whereas frequentist
approaches do not allow for inferences on null results, Bayesian methods allow one to
directly quantify evidence for the null hypothesis. One corollary of this is changing the
definition of ‘success’ in a replication from a significant p-value to rather accumulating
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Figure 2 . Risky choice proportion as a function of feedback condition (between-subjects).
Error bars depict standard error of the mean and numbers represent N’s in each condition.
Panel A contains data from the two experiments published in Newell et al. (2016). Panel B
contains replication conditions aggregated across four follow-up experiments. Panel C and
Panel D each contain data collected from the new conditions (history and losses) of the
follow-up unpublished experiments. ‘All-villages’ refers to receiving feedback about the
occurrence of disasters in all of the villages in the micro-world, ‘local’ refers to receiving
feedback only about disasters occurring in the village in which the participant is currently
living, and ‘own’ refers to receiving feedback only about disasters affecting the house
currently occupied by the participant (see Figure 1 for graphical illustration of the
micro-world). Follow-up experiment details included in the Supplementary materials.
estimates of the effect size (Brandt et al., 2014).
To summarise, the aim of this replication was to reconsider the evidence, published and
unpublished, for the rare disaster information effect in light of new data from a
pre-approved registered replication. We focused on the comparison of the two
between-subjects conditions that showed the largest mean difference in risky choices in the
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original publication i.e., All-villages and Local village. This choice allowed us to maximize
the n in each between-subject condition for the comparison of interest. We hypothesized
that rare disaster information covering all the villages would produce a greater proportion
of risky choices compared to disaster information covering only the local village.
Methods
Participants
In total, 242 participants were recruited from the UNSW undergraduate pool (162
females, M age = 19.4, SDage = 3.53). Two participants were excluded as they failed to
complete the task. Our sampling plan was to collect a minimum of 80 participants in each
feedback condition for a total N of 160. We continued collecting data until either a) model
comparisons produced a Bayes factor considered ‘strong’ evidence for the inclusion or
exclusion of the feedback factor, or b) we reached a maximum of 120 participants in each
condition. At N = 240, we discovered one participant was tested in the wrong condition
and so to preserve equal n’s in each condition, two additional participants were collected to
a total of 242.
Data
The data files and pre-registered analyses are available on the Open Science Framework
at https://osf.io/zcuhd/.
Materials
The experiment was displayed at 1920 x 1080 resolution, and responses were inputted
using a mouse. Participants were presented with a geographical map organised into three
villages, each containing 100 houses. The villages were spatially and visually distinct (see
Figure 1). The location, and the associated colour of each village was randomly selected
within the program.
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On each round, participants selected a house in which to reside from one of three
villages (henceforth referred to as ‘Safe’, ‘Risky 1’, and ‘Risky 2’). The distributions for
game points awarded by each village was provided in a table that was available to
participants throughout the experiment (see top right panel in Figure 1, and 1). In the
Safe village, disasters did not occur though the average number of points on each round
was modest. The risky villages yielded a more ‘attractive’ number of points on each round
but also bore the risk of a natural disaster, the occurrence of which resulted in a large loss
of points. In the Risky 1 village, disasters occurred at a rate of 10 times in 100 rounds, and
each disaster affected 9% of the dwellings in the village. In the Risky 2 village, disasters
occurred at a rate of once in 100 rounds though each disaster affected 90% of dwellings in
the village. Therefore, the individual home owner faced the same probability of disasters in
both risky regions (see Table 1).
Participants experienced two environments for 200 rounds each: a moderate
environment in which all three villages had equal expected value (that is, average number
of points per round), and a severe environment in which the two risky regions had a 25%
lower expected value than the safe region (see Table 1). All participants experienced the
moderate environment first, followed by the severe environment. Of note, the disaster
information effect held across both orderings of the environment (i.e. moderate to severe,
and severe to moderate) in Newell et al. (2016).
Design
Participants were randomly allocated into the two feedback conditions, namely the
Local-village, and All-villages feedback conditions. In the Local-village condition,
participants received full feedback only for disasters occurring in their chosen village and
were able to see which specific houses were damaged. In the All-villages condition,
participants received full feedback over the entire micro-world.
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Table 1
Payoff distributions within each environment
Moderate environment Severe environment
Safe Risky 1 Risky 2 Safe Risky 1 Risky 2
Payment/round 10 15 15 10 15 15
Disaster damage N/A -541 -541 N/A -819 -819
P(disaster) 0 0.01 0.10 0 0.01 0.10
P(negative event|disaster) N/A 0.90 0.09 N/A 0.90 0.09
Therefore, P(negative event) 0 0.009 0.009 0 0.009 0.009
Expected value (per round) +10 +9.996 +9.996 +10 +7.494 +7.494
Note. Payment/round is the average amount participants earn per round if no negative events
affect their dwelling. Disaster damage is the average amount lost if a negative event affected their
dwelling. The variability around each mean outcome was drawn from a uniform distribution of
integers, U [-3, +3]. The probability of disaster, p(disaster), refers to the probability that a
disaster would affect a region; the probability of a negative event given that a disaster hits,
P(negative event|disaster), refers to the extent of damage in the region. The information in bold
was available to participants; risks were presented as relative frequencies (for example, 1 in 100
rather than 0.01; see Figure 1). N/A, not applicable.
Procedure
Participants were presented with instructions explaining that their task was to select a
dwelling in which to reside on each round, and to accrue as many points as possible over
the task. Participants were given an accurate description of the risks of a disaster in each
region (shown throughout the task in a table in the upper-right of the participants screen;
see Table 1) and given feedback following each choice according to their condition. The
feedback informed participants whether or not a disaster occurred on that particular
round, and the number of points accrued/lost. This round-by-round amount was added
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to/subtracted from their total point tally which was displayed throughout the task. If
participants wished to move houses, a small moving cost was deducted from their point
total (see Supplementary materials for more detail). This move cost function was identical
to the function in Newell et al. (2016).
Participants first made 200 choices in the ‘moderate’ environment (four blocks of 50
rounds) before a prompt announced that the environment had changed. The distribution
information table (see Table 1) was then updated to reflect the new ‘severe’ environment
and a further 200 choices (four blocks) were made. Participants were debriefed about the
aims of the experiment and their remaining points were converted into money at the rate of
1000 points = $1.10 AUD.
Results
The analyses were conducted in RStudio (Version 3.3.3, 2015) using the ‘BayesFactor’
(Morey & Rouder, 2018) and ‘BEST’ packages (Kruschke, 2013).
We begin by examining Figure 3 which plots risky choice proportions within each
environment as a function of feedback. The original disaster information effect was that
risky choice proportions were greater in the All-villages feedback condition compared to the
Local-village feedback condition. The results of this replications indicate the opposite
effect; risky choice proportions were higher in the Local-village feedback condition as
compared to All-villages feedback condition. This difference held across both moderate
(MLocal = .68, SE = .03 vs. MAll = .59, SE = .03), and severe environments
(MLocal = .54, SE = .03 vs. MAll = .45, SE = .03). Across feedback conditions, risky
choice proportions were lower in the severe environment. This disparity reflected the more
punishing loss of points associated with disasters in the severe environment, where the
expected value of the Risky villages was 25% lower than the Safe village. However, the
spread of individual-level risky choice proportions across the entire range of values indicate
that choices were highly variable. Furthermore, there were a number of individuals at the
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Figure 3 . Violin density plots depict subject-level risky choice proportions as a function of
feedback condition (between-subjects) and environment (within-subjects). Points represent
individual participants with the mean (solid circle) and standard error also shown. Note
that the moderate environment preceded the severe environment.
extremes of 1 and 0 indicating exclusively risky and exclusively the safe choices over the
experiment.
Risky choice proportions were analysed using a Bayesian ANOVA with default priors
which compared models with factors of feedback, environment, block, and subject as a
random factor against a null model of subject alone (H0). The all main effects model with
feedback, environment, and block was favoured most relative to the null model (BF 10 =
6.66e+29). One way to examine how strongly the data support the inclusion of a factor in
a model is to examine the inclusion Bayes factor. That is, the relative performance of a
nested model that omits the parameter of interest. Comparing the full main effects model
to the nested model without feedback (BF 10 = 3.59e+29) produced a Bayes factor of 1.85,
anecdotal support for the inclusion of the feedback factor.
The inclusion of the block factor is explained by the gradual decline in risky choice
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proportions over the experiment. In the All-villages feedback condition, risky choice
proportions gradually declined in the initial blocks within the moderate environment before
stabilising in the severe environment. By comparison, risky choices in the Local-village
condition initially declined at a slower rate followed by a more dramatic drop at the
switching of environments (see Supplementary materials for Figure). Both the block and
environment effects were consistent with previous experiments (see Supplementary
materials for further details).
Figure 4 . The distribution of credible differences in risky choice proportion between the
feedback conditions. The All-villages condition is µ1 and the Local-village condition is µ2.
The 95% highest density interval ranges from -.167 to -.0118 and notably, 98.9% of the
credible values fall below zero.
While the above model comparison analysis can suggest parameters of interest, it does
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not provide information about the magnitude of these parameters. To more closely
examine our main parameter of interest, feedback, we estimated risky choice proportions
for the two feedback conditions using Bayesian estimation in the BEST package (Kruschke,
2013). Each feedback group was modelled as a t-distribution with a mean (µ), standard
deviation (δ), and a shared normality parameter (ν) to accommodate outliers. In total, five
parameters were estimated using MCMC methods with default, non-committal priors
spread widely across the parameter space (priors on the µ parameters were wide normal
distributions, uniform on the δ parameters, and an exponential on the ν parameter). This
was to minimize the effect of the prior on the posterior distribution and allow the data to
dictate the most credible combination of parameter values (see Kruschke, 2013 for further
details ). The output of this analysis is shown in Figure 4 as the posterior distribution for
differences between the estimated means (µ1 − µ2). The modal difference in risky choice
proportions between the All-villages (µ1) and Local-village (µ2) conditions was -.0916, with
98.9% of the credible values falling below zero.
Discussion
The aim of this paper was to reconsider the evidence for the rare disaster information
effect. The results of four unpublished follow-up experiments led our confidence in the
effect to wane and this uncertainty was the impetus for conducting a pre-registered
replication. As the effects of environment and block were consistent with previous
experiments, we focus the discussion on the main parameter of interest, feedback.
The published disaster information effect was the counter-intuitive finding that
risk-taking increased with additional disaster related feedback (Newell et al., 2016; Yechiam
et al., 2015). The explanation for the effect was that providing rare negative outcomes for
a particular region reinforced an attitude that usually ‘nothing goes wrong’ in that region.
However, the effect did not replicate in this registered replication, and - if anything - we
find evidence for the opposite effect: more risk taking under feedback for the Local than
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the All-villages condition. This pattern could now lead to a search for an alternative
explanation as to why Local-village feedback produced riskier choices compared to
All-village feedback. We are, however, reluctant to pursue such an explanation/speculation
at this stage - not least because this is not what we found in our original studies, and to a
minimal (non-significant) degree in some of our follow-up studies (see Introduction). Even
in this pre-registered replication, despite an almost 10% difference in means, evidence for
inclusion of feedback in the overall Bayesian model remains anecdotal. Overall, our various
examinations of the disaster information effect over the past couple of years suggest that it
is fickle: sometimes there is evidence for the original All-villages greater than Local effect,
sometimes the opposite, and sometimes neither. Taken together, these results imply that
any effect of feedback is small.
However, these datasets and future experiments using this task allow for many other
important questions to be asked. For example, how do people react once a disaster has
occurred? Does an individual’s resistance to moving houses change as a function of
witnessing or experiencing the effects of a disaster? Newell et al. (2016) explored some of
these questions in their original paper (see Supplementary Materials for that publication),
but only in a relatively preliminary way. Indeed, there is recent evidence that
decision-makers focus on the sequence of experienced outcomes which can explain a
number of probability learning and experience-based phenomena (Plonsky, Teodorescu, &
Erev, 2015; Szollosi, Liang, Konstantinidis, Donkin, & Newell, in press).
These questions have real life analogues that are pertinent not only to people’s
reactions to climate disasters but also financial ‘shocks’, workplace accidents and other
adverse outcomes. Investigating how information about these outcomes is provided or
represented, and the impact of different amounts of information remain worthwhile
pursuits. The current experimental setup produces a rich, trial-by-trial data set that would
allow one to answer such questions in detail. We look forward to attempting to do so in
our future work.
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